Using panel data models and the seven available waves of the Health and Retirement Study, we look at the effect of the 2000 repeal of the earnings test above the normal retirement age on retirement expectations of workers aged 51 to 61 -their probabilities to work past age 62 and 65 as well as the age at which they expect to start claiming old age social security benefits.. We use administrative records linked to the HRS to create variables that accurately reflect the change in financial incentives. For men, we find results in line with theoretical predictions on the probability to work after age 65. For example, men whose marginal wage rate increased when the earnings test was repealed, showed the largest increase in the probability to work full-time past normal retirement age. For women, we do not find significant results, possibly due to omitting spouse benefits and their interaction with the earnings test. We also do not find significant evidence of effects of the repeal of the earnings test on the probability to work past age 62 or the expected claiming age. On the other hand, for those reaching the normal retirement age, deviations between the age at which Social Security benefits are actually claimed and the previously reported expected age are more negative in 2000 than in 1998, suggesting that the repeal has increased claiming immediately after reaching normal retirement age. Since our calculations show that the tax introduced by the earnings test was small when accounting for actuarial benefit adjustments and differential mortality, our results suggest that although workers form expectations in a way consistent with forward-looking behavior, they misperceive the complicated rules of the earnings test.
Introduction
While several papers study the effect of the social security earnings test on actual retirement (e.g., Leonesio, 1990; Haider and Loughran, 2005) , little is known about how workers in their late fifties or early sixties who are not yet affected by the earnings test adjust their retirement plans and expectations in response to such an earnings test taxing away earnings later in life. The Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act of 2000 provides an excellent example of a natural experiment that can be used to look at this issue, involving a change in the effective tax structure across age groups. We analyze the effect of the repeal of the earnings test above the normal retirement age (NRA) in 2000 on expectations about employment and social security claiming after NRA of those who were younger than NRA at the time of the repeal.
Recent studies looking at the earnings test find large responses to the earnings test in terms of labor supply, earnings, claiming of benefits as well "bunching" of workers' earnings at the minimum exempt amount (Friedberg, 2000; Tran, 2004; Haider and Loughran, 2005) . This is despite the fact that benefits lost due to the earnings test are reimbursed at a later age trough an actuarial adjustment. This actuarial adjustment is generally believed to be actuarially fair for recent cohorts. One interpretation of this finding is that workers are simply myopic instead of forward looking. A necessary condition for workers to be forward-looking is that the expectations of their future behavior respond to changes in the incentive structure over the life-cycle. If forward looking workers in their late fifties and early sixties are aware of the repeal of the earnings test, they may adjust the expectations about their future labor market behavior.
They may also change their current behavior and for example substitute labor supply intertemporally so as to maximize lifetime utility. In the end, the desirability of the earnings test depends on its disincentive effects on lifetime labor supply and wealth. 3 Hence, looking at changes in expectations following the repeal contributes to understanding better the life-cycle responses to the rules of a program like the Old Age Social Insurance benefits but also to understanding how workers' plans for retirement are affected by the tax structure. 3 Other considerations on the desirability of the earnings test include whether its elimination would induce workers to retire "too early", not taking into account the lower benefits level (Gruber and Orszag, 2003) . This could have damaging implications for poverty in old age. Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) point to the fact that the elimination of the earnings test could affect the short-term viability of the Social Security Trust Fund. This paper first documents the size of the taxes induced by the earnings test in the population covered by the Health and Retirement Study, using administrative earnings records from the Social Security Administration. These calculations take account of the actuarial adjustment and allow for differential mortality profiles using survival probabilities accounting for the heterogeneity in subjective mortality beliefs elicited in the HRS. Second, we look at the effect of the repeal of the earnings test on expectations of workers not yet directly affected by the test in 2000. We consider expectations to work full-time past ages 62 and 65 as well as the age at which workers expect to start collecting Social Security benefits. We also look at the extent to which workers later deviate from these expectations because of the repeal of the earnings test. The identification strategy makes use of the pre-repeal tax rates calculated in the first step.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we first discuss the nature of the earnings test and sketch a stylized life-cycle framework of individual behavior that helps to understand how people can react to eliminating the earnings test in a static and in a life-cycle setting. Then we discuss the expectations variables we want to analyze and present some descriptive statistics for the time periods before and after the policy change, illustrating the fact that there have been substantial changes in retirement expectations (section 3). Section 4 discusses the construction of the financial incentive variables from administrative SSA records linked to HRS, which we use to answer the question whether the earnings test is a still a tax when the actuarial adjustment is taken into account. In section 5, we present the estimates of some empirical models for panel data, based on a difference in differences approach and random effects panel data models.
That approach rests on the tax rates constructed in Section 4. Section 6 looks at the effect of elimination of the earnings test on actual behavior, particularly the actual age at which people start claiming Social Security benefits. Section 7 concludes.
The Earnings Test and Its Potential Effects on Labor Supply
Details on the rules of Old Age Social Insurance (OASI) benefits since its inception in 1951, including the working of earnings tests for several age groups, are presented in Benitez-Silva and Heiland (2005) . Here we focus on the features that are relevant for our study on the effect of eliminating the earnings test for the age group 65-70 in 2000. These are presented in Table 1 .
To be more precise, the earnings test was abolished for people above the normal retirement age (NRA), 4 for OASI benefits received before NRA. As shown in Table 1 , if someone claims OASI benefits before reaching NRA, the OASI benefit is reduced by one US dollar of every two dollars earned above an exempt amount. This exempt amount grew from $7,440 per year in 1992 (the year of the first wave of HRS) up to $11,640 in 2004 in nominal terms.
A similar test applied until April 7 of the year 2000 to earnings for those who claimed benefits and had positive earnings after their NRA. 5 The OASI benefit was reduced by one dollar for every three dollars earned in excess of the exempt amount, which was $ 14,500 in 1998. 6 Thus from a static, one period point of view, the earnings test is similar to a means tested benefit. In a multi-period setting however, it should be kept in mind that someone gets compensated for not receiving OASI benefits in a given year by receiving more in the future. This is illustrated in the final two rows of the table.
If individuals 7 postpone claiming for another year and have not yet reached the NRA, they get 6.8 percent (ARF, the actuarial reduction factor) higher benefits every year in the future than they would get were they to retire and start claiming immediately. On average this appears to be an actuarially fair growth rate of future old age benefits. A different rate applies after the NRA. Postponing claiming for another year after NRA used to pay somewhat less, as is illustrated in the last line of the . There was some discussion in the regular press about the upcoming reform. On February 20 th , the New York Times reports that the president already signaled his attention to sign the bill if passed which shows that there was little uncertainty about the possibility that the law would be in effect before the end of the year. The repeal was in effect for earnings after December 31 st 1999. 6 In the year a worker reaches the normal retirement age, there is a special exemption for earnings in that calendar year. This exemption was $17,000 in 2000. See §1803.2 of the Social Security Handbook. 7 For couples, the situation is often more complicated, due to spouse benefits. For those collecting spouse benefits, the earnings test is applied on their spouse's earnings. We ignore this issue in the current paper. retirement credit is roughly fair for younger cohorts, while it was actuarially less than fair for older cohorts. For those born prior to 1926, DRC was 3.5%.
For earnings lost before NRA, the actuarial adjustment starts at NRA. Each full monthly check lost gives rise to a one month actuarial adjustment. Hence someone who claims at age 62 and loses all his checks in that year because of high earnings will receive the same check as someone who claimed at age 63 from the point where they reach NRA onwards. Before NRA however, the one who claimed early (and lost his first year benefit), will get checks from age 63 to the NRA that do not include the actuarial adjustment.
A Two-Period Model
Prior to 2000, the actuarial adjustment operated in the same way after the NRA as before the NRA. The only difference was that the actuarial adjustment (delayed retirement credit), was applied the following year rather than being restricted to after a later age. In a static one period model of labor supply, this compensation is ignored. In a dynamic framework, optimizing individuals will take this increase in future benefits into account when making their labor supply decisions, under the condition that they are aware of it. Whether the latter is indeed the case is not so clear, see, e.g., Friedberg (2000) who argues that their labor supply behavior reveals that they are not. Gruber and Orszag (2003) show that in one of the leading tax guides, no mention of the actuarial adjustment is made. To understand the labor supply effects of the earnings test in a dynamic framework, we construct a simple two-period model along the lines of Disney and Smith (2001) . Spouses and spouse benefits are ignored. For convenience, we present the model for a single male.
For simplicity, assume individuals make decisions over two periods. In period 1, the individual can decide to claim OASI benefits or not, and can also choose hours of work h. In period 2, the individual claims in any case (whether he was claiming in period 1 or not), and does not work. The hourly wage rate in the first period is denoted by w. If he was claiming already in period 1, the individual gets pension 1 P in period 2. Define 2 1 0 
P P P
If the individual decides to claim and work in the first period, income can be affected by the earnings test. The earnings test rule is defined by two parameters: the maximum earnings allowed without being taxed E (the exempt amount) and the rate at which benefits are taxed away by the earnings test for each dollar above E, the "tax rate" τ.
Three situations can occur depending on how many hours the individual decides to work. 
Finally, an individual who works more than max h gets
Note that (1) and (4) are equivalent in the case where desired hours are so high that it exhausts all benefits. This would not be true if there was no actuarial adjustment under the earnings test. In that case, we would essentially have 0
This will also be the relevant case for individuals who realize that they get a compensation for postponing claiming ( 0 δ > ) but do not realize that they are compensated in the same way if they have started to claim but their benefits are partially or completely taxed away by the earnings test; such individuals will base their decisions on the perception that π equals zero.
For individuals who do not intend to work in period 1 or for those who want to work few hours such that their earnings are below the maximum allowed under the earnings test, it may still be profitable to delay claiming rather than to claim immediately. This is the case if the actuarial adjustment 1 P δ is large enough to compensate for the lost benefits 0 P . In this two period model, the condition for this is 1/ δ θ > , i.e., the individual perceives the compensation for delayed claiming as more than fair.
To illustrate how expected income is affected by the earnings test, we consider the following example, corresponding to the situation of a worker at the normal retirement age having a $20 wage rate per hour and a pension entitlement of 10,000$ in the first and the second period (with the latter excluding the potential adjustment if less than the full benefit is claimed in period 1). We consider his decision just prior to the repeal of the earnings test at the normal retirement age. The tax rate is 33% and the exempt earnings maximum E is $14,500. The individual's subjective discount rate θ is assumed to be 0.97 and the actuarial adjustment δ is 0.75 which is perceived as unfair (1/0.97=1.0302>0.75).
We consider two situations when the individual is claiming in the first period. One is the actual situation where adjustment due to the earnings test is possible ( 0 π > ) and the other one is the situation where the individual is unaware of the adjustment in case the earnings test applies ( 0 π = ).
To summarize: 
Data
We use the Health and Retirement Study using all available cohorts in the waves 1992 -2004. Moreover, although their NRA is clearly after the year of the repeal, expectations of younger workers, particularly those in the War Babies cohort, can also be affected by the repeal. The delayed retirement they face, however, is more advantageous than the one their predecessors faced. Thus if they were aware of the DRC before the repeal and do not face liquidity constraints, the repeal is less likely to have had a large effect on them.
Match with Social Security Earnings Records
In order to obtain exact information on OASI entitlements and how these are Second, there are a fair number of respondents for whom a match to an SSA earnings record is not possible. In the HRS cohort, 75.1% of respondents have a successful match. For CODA and War Babies respondents, the match rates are much lower (50-60%) than in the original HRS cohort. We will present some descriptive statistics for the two groups (those with and those without a match; see Table 4 below). It will turn out that in terms of observables the two samples do not differ much.
We use the Average National Wage Index constructed by the Social Security
Administration to project earnings into the future. These earnings are needed to compute various measures of future retirement incentives. Over the period 1985-2003, the average growth rate was roughly 4%. Over the same period, inflation (measured by the Consumer Price Index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) was on average 2.9% per year, thus yielding an about 1% real growth in earnings. Inevitably, constructing projected earnings profile introduces some "measurement" error. The maintained assumptions are that workers project to work the same hours as they currently work in the future, and that the growth rate of wages is the same across all groups of workers. Neither of these assumptions is likely to be completely correct. Still, we expect only a limited gain of replacing these projections by forecasts at an individual level. For example, a major impediment for forecasting individual earnings using the observed earnings profile in the cross-section or the panel is that they will suffer from strong selection due to retirement incentives.
Sample Selection
For our analysis, we select respondents aged 51 to 61 who report to be working for pay. We do this because the expectations questions we will examine are only asked to workers. This means we have an unbalanced sample where we follow respondents when age eligible and working. In 1992, the entire original HRS cohort is age eligible. In later waves, some HRS respondents have moved out of this age group. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of some background variables that we shall use in the analysis of expectations in the age 51-61 sample.
Descriptive Statistics
One aspect of workers' environment that may be important when analyzing the earnings test is the flexibility of their current job. If workers cannot change hours at their current employer, they need to change jobs to reduce hours (see, e.g., Hurd, 1996) . This may be difficult, particularly for workers in their late 60s because demand for workers of this age may be lower and search costs may be higher. Some information on job flexibility is available in the HRS as of 1996. We use two questions, for which the response rate is quite high (in the 90%). The first refers to whether the respondent feels pressured by co-workers to retire before 65. This is used to measure the general attitude of co-workers (and often employers) to older workers. The other question refers to whether the respondent thinks that a transition to a low demanding job is relatively easy at his current employer. This measures the flexibility to reduce work pressure, hours, or responsibilities at the current job. We code the answers as one (yes) if the respondent reports either "strongly agree" or "agree" and zero (no) otherwise. Over all waves, approximately one tenth of workers aged 51-61 think they are pressured to retire before 65 at their current employer. More than one quarter thinks that a transition to a low demanding job with the same employer is possible.
Finally, we consider measures of current earnings, accumulated financial wealth under representation of blacks is found, as well some difference in total financial wealth.
We focus on three measures of expectations. The first one is the subjective probability to work full-time in any period past age 65. This measure is relatively well documented, see, e.g., Hurd (1999) and Chan and Stevens (2004) . The exact wording of the question is "Thinking about work generally and not just your present job, what do you think are the chances that you will be working full-time after you reach 65". The answer is a number between 0 and 100 (in 1992 between 0 and 10 which is adjusted). We refer to this question as P(65). The question is only asked when the respondent provided a positive probability to another probability question that asks for the probability of working full-time past age 62. If the answer to this question (P (62)) is zero, P(65) is assigned a value of zero as well. Respondents are not asked P(62) and P(65) if they are 62 or older. 9 We will focus on the effect of the repeal of the earnings test after NRA on P(65), but will also consider its potential effects on P(62). We expect smaller effects here than for P(65), but it may be the case that respondents who change their mind about working at age 65 are more likely to keep working between age 62 and age 65, due to the costs of labor force exit and entry. 9 There are some exceptions due to routing inconsistencies.
The third expectations question we consider is the expected age at which respondents expect to claim Social Security benefits. We will denote this variable as EC.
Values are missing for respondents who reported they did not anticipate receiving any Social Security benefits. There is a fair amount of don't knows as well. Overall, the value is missing for 19-24% of the respondents in our sample (varying across waves). Note that EC is just a point estimate, if respondents are uncertain it may be the most likely age at which they think they can start claiming, or the median or mean of their subjective distribution. Thus the information in this point estimate is more ambiguous than the information in the probability questions P(62) and P(65) (cf. Manski, 2004). Table 5 shows the evolution of expectations over time. Answers to P(65) and EC show an upward trend over time in this sample. Of course, we do not know if this is a true time effect because the composition of the sample changes over waves. This is a consequence of the age restriction -only respondents younger than 62. This age restriction is needed for P(62) and P(65) because these questions are not asked after that, and is also used for the expected claiming age to avoid dealing with the sample selection problem introduced by those who start claiming from age 62. Furthermore, because refreshments come into the sample in 1998 and 2004, any differences across cohorts that are not caused by the repeal, will show up in the aggregate time trend also. Fortunately, the longitudinal nature of our data allows us to control for such changes in the composition over time (see section 5).
Calculation of Incentive Measures from the Earnings Test
Since we can calculate social security benefits and potential loss due to the earnings test for respondents with a match, we can calculate various measures of social security wealth that involve the effect of the earnings test at the early retirement age (62) and the normal retirement age (65 or 66). We consider three such measures:
A. Myopic loss: In the year where earnings are above the maximum allowed, the loss is given by
It is the loss in benefit that the worker incurs if he earns wh at age k. 
where , ( ) L k S s represents the life-table probability of living to age s given survival up to age k. The terminal age A is set such that , ( ) 0
P is the pension someone gets at age s from claiming at age k.
C. Forward-Looking Loss according to subjective survival probabilities: As discussed by Tran (2004) , the actuarial adjustment may be fair for some but not for others who have lower life expectancy. This is particularly important in the case of the earnings test since individuals who are at the kink (the point where the earnings test kicks in), are likely to have lower socio-economic status and health than those high in the earnings distribution. One reason why the earnings test might have an effect on those workers is that the actuarial adjustment is relatively unfair for them. We also consider a forward-looking loss measure that takes account of the dispersion in survival probabilities in the population. Delavande and Rohwedder (2006) find that the heterogeneity in subjective probabilities proxies very closely the variation in true survival probabilities in the HRS/AHEAD panel. We therefore construct a set of probabilities , ( ) j k S s for groups of respondents characterized by health, education, gender and age (see section 4.2 for details). Essentially, the life-table survival profile is adjusted for variation in subjective survival across these cells. The subjective loss is given by 1 ,
Note that (6) and (7) are not exactly correct in the case where we evaluate the loss at the early retirement age. In that case, the actuarial adjustment only kicks in once the worker reaches the NRA. One way to incorporate that is to define For forward looking measures, we use a real discount rate of 3% (i.e., 0.97
We use a 2.9% inflation rate in our forecast. Thus the nominal discount rate we use is 5.9%.
Calculation of Benefits
We calculate the AIME of each respondent for each year in the survey as well as the projected AIME from ages 62 to 69. As for growth in future earnings, we use the growth in the Average National Wage Index. We take the last Social Security earnings in the SS.Er as the basis for computing each projection. This also assumes that the worker continues to work until the age at which we calculate the AIME. Hence, we adjust quarters of coverage accordingly so that an individual who is not eligible at age 55 but works until 62 could become eligible at age 62. In general workers are eligible if they accumulated more than 40 quarters of coverage (10 years where they accumulated 4 credits from covered earnings). To calculate benefits, we use a formula constructed from the Social Security Handbook. We have done limited benchmark against the Social Security ANYPIA formula. Many parameters of the benefit formula are adjusted every year by SSA to reflect general changes in prices and cost-of-living. For years beyond 2004, parameters of the formula such as bend points for computing the PIA, the exempt amount under the Earnings test, the maximum taxable earnings for Social Security are all updated using their average growth rate over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . This is usually closely in line with the average national wage index. Hence, this implies that workers expect a change in those parameters which is consistent with previous recent changes to the benefit formula.
In the formula, we do not implement dependent benefits. The earnings test become much more complicated for those receiving spouse benefits (their benefit depends on their as well as their spouse's behavior). Hence, we calculate only benefits available under the respondent's earnings record. This approximation is likely to be very close to actual benefits for men but perhaps different for females who draw spouse benefits. We take into account the minimum PIA in case the worker's PIA is too low.
Upon calculating the PIA, the benefit is adjusted for early or late claiming using the Actuarial Reduction factor (ARF before NRA) and the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) that applies depending on the birth cohort. We implement the COLA adjustment which adjusts for inflation and cost-of-living increases. The average cost-of-living adjustment over the period 1985-2003 is used (2.9%). Finally, the earnings test is implemented using the rules in effect as outlined in Table 1 .
Survival Probabilities

Using life tables
To operationalize our adjustment of life-table survival probabilities, we start from a simple exponential hazard model widely used to approximate survival curves, the Gompertz hazard. We assume that life table mortality rates follow the specification
, where a is age and the parameters 0,L κ and 1,L κ control the level and the slope of the log mortality rate. Using
, the probability to survive until at least age a is given by
Conditional on surviving up to age a, an individual has a probability to survive up
Using subjective probabilities
The HRS asks age eligible respondents to report the probability they will survive up to age 75. Answers to such questions are known to include considerable measurement error, as well as focal responses (at 0, 50 and 100). Hence, estimation of individual survival curves is difficult (see Gan, Hurd and McFadden, 2003) . We therefore prefer to estimate group level subjective survival curves. We define groups by age (2 year age categories), education level (less than 12 yrs, 12 yrs, more than 12 yrs) and health status (excellent /very good/good or fair/poor). We pool all waves (ignoring calendar time effects) and calculate the mean of the subjective probability responses within each ageeducation-health cell. Hence, a respondent's cell and reference subjective life-table can change over waves if the respondent changes group, e.g. due to deterioration of health or simply due to aging.
In terms of the Gompertz model, the answers to the subjective probability question from age a to age 75 represent a point on the conditional subjective survival curve of group j, 0, 
We impose that the baseline hazard across all groups is the same as the baseline hazard of the life-table
). This means we estimate the proportional change in the mortality hazard across groups but not the baseline hazard. The shape could be estimated using the probability question to age 85 or using the fact that the conditional survival curve is observed at different ages (from age 51 to 61). However, an analytical solution is difficult to obtain for the two parameters simultaneously.
We can estimate 0, 1, , L L κ κ from the life table mortality rates. We do this separately for men and women and for each year in the survey, using the yearly life-tables available at www.mortality.org (based on Vital Statistics). We regress
where u is an error term. Define the log ratio of the conditional survival probabilities to age s from age a as
where 1,
This last term is "known" from estimation of the life-table parameters of the mortality hazard.
The proportional constant for group j is then given by
where
The conditional subjective survival at each age for group j can be calculated from (9). These "corrections" adjust only for differences in the level of the log mortality hazard. Since this is probably the predominant difference in the underlying true hazard, this is likely to capture a considerable amount of differential mortality across groups. Hurd and McGarry, 1995) .
For males, underprediction is rather small (3%), compared to 12% for females.
Incentive Measures: Is the Earnings Test a Tax?
We first describe patterns of expected social security wealth assuming workers retire when they claim Social Security benefits. This helps understand the heterogeneity in the actuarial adjustment which workers face when they consider claiming benefits. We compute Social Security wealth as , ,
Here , k s P is the annual social security benefit that we project the respondent could get at age s if starting to claim at age k . In addition to this measure, we compute an "accrual"
Similarly, we compute accrual rates , j k A using subjective mortality rates instead of life tables. If the accrual rate is zero, this means that the actuarial adjustment is perceived as fair from the point of view of the worker (given the assumptions on the survival probabilities and the discount rate). If it is negative, the worker loses in terms of expected social security wealth if he delays claiming. Because workers differ in terms of their potential benefits, earnings history, birth cohort (which determines many benefit rule parameters), and life expectancy (in the subjective case), there is considerable variation in the accruals. 51-61. It also reports the ratios of these quantiles to the median and the distribution of accruals defined in equation (14). This is done using both life-table probabilities and the adjusted mortality probabilities in equation (9).
Using life-table probabilities, median expected social security wealth at age 62 is $148,000. There is considerable variance, with the 10 th quantile expecting $58,000 (0.39 times the median) and the 90 th quantile expecting $228,000 (1.54 times the median).
Hence, simply in terms of income effect, workers differ in their incentives to claim benefits as early as possible. The variance is larger when using subjective based survival rates. The median using subjective survival probabilities is lower ($147,000) which reflects higher pessimism in the subjective survival probabilities of workers, on average
The ratio of the 10 th and 90 th quantile to the median (0.38 and 1.67 respectively) reflect somewhat higher variance than when using life-table probabilities, which can be explained by the heterogeneity in subjective survival probabilities.
Social Security accruals are generally positive at the median until age 65 where for some workers, the DRC may not be sufficient to compensate for increased mortality risk. There is also considerable heterogeneity in accruals. For example, at age 65, half of the sample has a negative accrual while the other half has a positive accrual. Accruals tend to be lower in general using subjective probabilities because of higher aggregate mortality risk. But again the distribution is more dispersed than when using life-table accruals. At age 65, the 90 th quantile faces a 2.47% accrual if he delays claiming to age 66, compared to 2.0% when using the life-table.
The median accrual decreases with age. It is interesting to note that the difference between subjective and life-table accruals is largest in the right tail of the distribution (i.e.
for workers with high accruals). For these workers, life-table probabilities lead to considerable "overestimation" of the accrual, as revealed by their subjective probabilities of survival. The actuarial adjustment is at the center of the question as to whether the earnings test is a tax or not. Table 7 shows that this adjustment is likely to be perceived as unfair by a large fraction of the population around the normal retirement age.
In Table 8 , we compute the loss (or gain) due to the earnings test using the myopic loss k e , the forward-looking measure using life-table survival probabilities , L k f and using subjective survival probabilities , j k f . These losses are reported in dollars, as a fraction of earnings, and as a fraction of liquid financial assets (as a measure of liquidity constraints). The myopic loss is larger at age 62 than at the NRA. This is due to a higher exempt amount at the NRA and a lower marginal tax rate. The heterogeneity in myopic tax rates is largely due to differences in projected earnings as well as differences in benefit entitlements.
Because of actuarial adjustments, the forward looking tax is much lower than the myopic rate. Of course, if the actuarial adjustment was perceived as completely fair, there would be no such tax. Additional heterogeneity is introduced when computing these forward-looking taxes. These now vary by birth cohort (due to different actuarial adjustment) and other differences entering the survival probabilities. The subjective forward-looking tax measure is somewhat higher for females than for males. This is because females underpredict their probability to live up to age 75.
Since one interpretation why workers might prefer to claim and be subject to the earnings test is that they are liquidity constrained, we express these same taxes as a fraction of current liquid wealth. This shows that for most workers, the tax due to the earnings test is relatively small. But for a fraction of workers, the tax actually represents a large fraction of their liquid wealth
Because actuarial adjustments and the normal retirement age change across cohorts, there is considerable heterogeneity in incentives across cohorts. Table 9 gives the median of the various tax variables by birth year. These numbers help understand why the earnings test will have different effects across different cohorts. For those born in 1932, the forward-looking tax is much larger than for those born latter. This can be explained by the lower delayed retirement credit faced by those workers. For the workers that will be affected by the earnings test in 2000, born in 1935, the delayed retirement credit was 6.0% (see Table 1 ), leading to tax rates that are relatively low.
The mean forward looking tax rate is very close to zero for younger workers.
About 90% of workers in the age 51-61 sample face a tax lower than $5000 on life-time Social Security wealth. Expressed as a fraction of earnings or financial wealth, the tax imposed by the earnings test is therefore not large. Hence, if workers perceive the rules correctly, we should not expect them to react significantly to the repeal. This response is even less likely for workers born in latter cohorts, for whom the rate of actuarial adjustment is larger.
The Effect of the Repeal on Expectations
As explained in Section 2, workers with different expected loss due to the earnings test are predicted to react differently to the repeal. This is the case if workers are not aware of the actuarial adjustment compensating for benefits lost due to the earnings test, or, to a lesser extent, to workers who perceive the actuarial adjustment as actuarially unfair. This suggests that we can use a difference-in-difference approach by grouping workers according to the pre-repeal incentives they faced as a consequence of the earnings test. The key to this identification strategy is the determination of the groups that get different treatments. We define the groups based on the percentage of social security benefits predicted to be lost at the normal retirement age (NRA).
For example, those who were not expected to be affected by the repeal, i.e. had no loss due to the earnings test, are not likely to react to its repeal. This concerns everyone with earnings below the exempt amount. On the other hand, those who earn exactly the exempt amount or somewhat more should react to the repeal -it will increase the marginal return to working more hours, and we therefore expect them to get a higher probability to work full-time past age 65. For the group who earn substantially more than the exempt for whom a high share of their benefit but not everything is taxed away, the same substitution effect applies, but this is more likely to be compensated by an income effect: eliminating the earnings test will not only change their marginal wage but also bring them to a higher indifference curve. This effect will become larger the higher the amount of benefit which was lost under the earnings test. Hence, for the group that has a substantial fraction taxed away, the total effect is unknown. Finally, for the group for whom all benefits are taxed away under the earnings test, there will be no substitution effect but only a (probably negative) income effect, and one would expect a negative effect of eliminating the earnings test on the probability to work past 65.
We thus define groups in the following way: For males, the results for P(65), the probability to work full-time at any point in time after reaching age 65, are in line with what the theory discussed above predicts.
Respondents for whom the earnings test was not binding (group 1) hardly change their average P(65), and the fraction with nonzero P(65) does not change much either. This suggests that there is not much of a trend in P(65). For group 2, the group for which we predicted the largest positive effect, we indeed find a substantial increase in the average value of the probability to work full-time after the normal retirement age of 65 years, and we also find a substantial increase in the fraction reporting that this probability is nonzero. Taking group 1 as the control group (the group with no treatment), the difference in differences estimators are 2.98%-points for the increase in the average P(65) and 7.75%-points for the increase in the percentage of male workers with nonzero P(65).
For group 3, we find positive but smaller effects, in line with theory -here the positive substitution effect is partly cancelled by a negative income effect. Finally, for group 4, we do not find much of an effect. We would have expected to find a negative income effect here, but their change in P(65) is actually somewhat larger than that for the control group instead of smaller. For these workers, Social Security benefits may actually represent a small share of their total wealth.
For female workers, the effects are quite different. All groups have positive changes, including the control group, suggesting a positive trend in the probability to work full-time past age 65 for these cohorts. The three groups that are affected by the earnings test (and its elimination) all show larger positive effects than the control group, implying that elimination of the earnings test will have a positive effect on labor supply.
In contrast to the theoretical prediction and the results for men, however, the effect is small for group 2 and larger for groups 3 and 4. An explanation may be that for women, spouse benefits play a large role, and their importance will correlate with their own group assignment (because of joint features in earnings capacity and labor supply of couples).
Spouse benefits are not accounted for in our analysis. We therefore do not want to make much of the results for females.
In the bottom panel of Table 10 , we consider the expected age at which respondents think they will start claiming old age social security benefits. If people would think they are heavily taxed by the earnings test (ignoring or downgrading the compensation in the form of actuarial adjustment), but would realize that claiming later leads to higher benefits, we would expect that abolishing the earnings test has positive effects on the probability to claim at (or before) the normal retirement age. These effects should be largest for the people who are taxed most, i.e., for groups 3 and 4. On the other hand, if labor supply increases due to elimination of the earnings test, people will be less in need of immediate benefits and will tend to postpone claiming. This gives a negative effect on the probability to claim at NRA, particularly for group 2 and to a lesser extent for group 3. The results show that for all groups the probability to postpone claiming till after NRA rises over time, but the change is largest for group 1, the group that is unaffected by the earnings test. Thus abolishing the earnings test seems to make people claim earlier, in line with the first effect discussed above -their earnings are no longer taxed away. The differences between the three groups, however, are not in line with the theoretical arguments, neither for men nor for women.
An alternative interpretation would be that many workers also do not understand the negative consequences of early claiming for their future benefits level. Many workers will simply anticipate that they will start claiming when they stop working. Again, however, this is not in line with the results -we would then expect the largest positive effect on the probability to postpone claiming for group 2, the group with the largest positive effect on labor supply after NRA.
The difference in differences estimator only consider the balanced sample of individuals who work and answer the expectations questions both in 1998 and 2002. In order to exploit the complete unbalanced sample, we formulate a model that also controls for several background characteristics.
We observe for each individual i in wave 1,..., i t T = , the subjective probability to work past age 65, it p , and the age at which respondents expect to claim benefits it e . We model it p with a two-limit tobit equation, accounting for the substantial number of zeros and 100 in the observed answers: 
∑
We consider two specifications, one where the it u are assumed to be independent over time (pooled tobit) and one where the it u are equi-correlated, i.e., are the sum of an error term which is assumed to be independent over time, and an individual effect which remains the same over time.
We include dummies for three of the four groups to capture differences between groups that remain constant over time, and time dummies to capture the trend relevant for all groups. (These variables were also included in the model which implicitly was behind the difference in difference estimates presented in Table 10 ). We also incorporate a number of background characteristics, some constant over time (race and education), others time varying (health, job characteristics, pension entitlements, household wealth).
The left hand panels of Tables 11a and 11b There are some differences in size of coefficients between the two columns, but qualitative conclusions are largely similar. The findings for men are largely in line with the difference in differences estimates in Table 10 . We find results in accordance with theory -the largest positive effects of eliminating the earnings test are found for those whose marginal wage increases, a positive substitution effect. Unlike in Table 10 , however, there is no evidence that an income effect in the opposite direction would reduce the total change for those with a substantial income gain (group 3). The estimated effect for group 3 is actually somewhat larger than that for group 2, though not significantly so. Evidence of an income effect is also not apparent from group 4 -its reaction to the elimination is not significantly different from that of the control group.
For women, the sign and ordering of the effects are in line with theory, with group 2 having the largest positive (substitution) effect, a smaller positive effect for group 3, and a negative (income) effect for group 4. None of these effects are significant, however.
In column 3, we consider the binary event whether a worker reports a positive or a zero probability to work full-time after age 65. A random effects probit model is used, with a specification that is otherwise the same as the random effects tobit model in the second column. The results for men are more in line with the theory than those for the tobit models, in the sense that group 2 now is affected most by elimination of the earnings test. The effect for group 3 is positive also, but smaller and not significant. For women, the results are qualitatively similar to those for the tobit models. The effects have the sign and ranking predicted by theory, but none of them is significant.
We also considered P(62), the probability of working past age 62. We have estimated the same models for this as for P (65), but found that the repeal of the earnings test had a small and insignificant effect for all groups. See the Appendix for the results.
This is understandable -although there are reasons why there could be indirect labor supply effects of the earnings test on P(62), the effects are likely to be smaller than those on P(65) where within period is immediately affected. The fact that we do not find evidence of these effects could be seen as evidence against intertemporal substitution or life-cycle optimization, but it could also just mean that these indirect effects are too small to be significant in the available sample.
Columns 4 and 5 of Tables 11a and 11b present the estimates of the effect of elimination of the earnings test on the expected claiming age. Column 4 presents the results of a random effects ordered probit model, distinguishing three cases: claiming before NRA, claiming at NRA, or claiming after NRA. A positive coefficient indicates that the probability to claim before NRA falls while the probability to claim after NRA rises (the effect on claiming at NRA is ambiguous). In column 5, no distinction is made between claiming before or at the normal retirement age, and a random effects probit model is estimated. The right hand sides of the ordered probit and probit models are specified in the same way as in the models for P(65).
In line with the results in Table 10 , the parameter estimates are small, and we do not find significant effects on the expected claiming age. Only if the three groups that are affected by the earnings test are merged (top panel of the table), we find marginally significant effect for men and a significant effect in the ordered probit for women, but the signs of the effects are opposite in the ordered probit and the probit model.
Deviations from Expectations
In the previous section we found that the repeal of the earnings test after NRA has had an effect on the probability that male respondents will work after age 65, but we found no evidence on an effect on the expected claiming age. One possible explanation for the latter might be that respondents report their most likely retirement age and the effect of the repeal may not be large enough to change this, even though the repeal does have an effect on the probability distribution. In this sense, the expected claiming age is not so informative. In this section we look at the realized claiming age, which does not suffer from the same problem -it is a realization, not a forecast. We consider two indicators of actual claiming decisions: whether someone claims when reaching NRA (or earlier), and the difference between the age when someone starts claiming and the last available forecast (given at age 61 or earlier).
For the actual decisions when respondents start claiming Social Security benefits, we select the survey years 1998 and 2000 and look at respondents who reach NRA between these two waves, who have not yet claimed Social Security benefits in 1998, and who will eventually claim prior to age 70.
10 Table 12 presents the results. The number of respondents who claim immediately after reaching NRA increases with the repeal of the earnings test. The increase is substantial for men (13.7%-points), and smaller for women (3.7%-points). On the other hand, as we saw earlier, the expected claiming age does not show the same reaction to the repeal. As a consequence, we find that the average difference between actual and expected claiming age has become negative in 2000, while it was almost zero in 1998, for both men and women.
The bottom panel distinguishes the same four groups as before, on the basis of how much their earnings are taxed while the earnings test is still in place. Men and women have been merged to increase sample size. Still, sample size is quite small and the results should be interpreted with some care -differences are not statistically significant at the usual levels. Still, the results suggest that particularly those who were most affected by the earnings test decide to claim earlier after the earnings test is repealed. The groups with tax rates higher than 50% are the groups for which the difference between actual and expected claiming age is less (i.e., less positive or more negative) in 2000 than in 1998.
The increase in the fraction of people claiming immediately after NRA is largest for the group with the highest tax on their SS benefits under the earnings test (27%-points), and the differences are also positive but smaller for the other groups who are taxed.
While suffering from small sample size, all these results thus point in the same direction: the repeal of the earnings has induced a change in actual claiming behavior that is in line with economic theory -more people claim immediately upon reaching NRA, because their benefits are no longer taxed by the earnings test. This leaves us with the question why we do not find an effect on expected claiming age, while the results for P(65) suggest that (male) respondents do adjust their expected labor supply behavior. A possible answer is that the expected claiming age provides incomplete information on the respondents' subjective probability distribution. It may well reflect the most likely outcome only, and probabilities may change without changing this most likely outcome.
Conclusions
The elimination of the earnings test on social security benefits after the normal retirement age has been used as a natural experiment in various studies on actual labor supply at an older age. In this study, we have focused on how this policy changes affects expectations of workers who have not yet reached an age at which they can claim old age social security benefits. We have presented a two period theoretical model, demonstrating that workers should react in different ways, depending on where they are on their budget set while the earnings test is still in place. This model also implies that the effects are smaller if workers realize that taxed away benefits will be returned in later years with actuarial adjustment. In that case, depending on the individual's discount factor and the actuarial adjustment rate, it may even be the case that the earnings test is irrelevant.
The advantage of looking at expectations is that we can see how expectations of the same people develop over time. Moreover, since some groups were not affected by the earnings test in the first place, a control group is available. Administrative social security records linked to the core HRS data allow us to distinguish the control group and several treatment groups in our data. Combining this with the time dimension allows for a difference in differences approach. We applied this both to the self-reported probability of working full-time after age 65 (the normal retirement age during the time period we consider), and to the self-reported expected claiming age.
For men, we find substantial effects of elimination of the earnings test that on the probability to work after the normal retirement age, and the qualitative effects are in line with the theoretical predictions under the assumption that people do not realize that benefits taxed away by the earnings test are returned later with actuarial adjustment, or under the assumption that people have large discount rates or face liquidity constraints so that they hardly account for the future consequences of their current decisions. For women, no clear effects of elimination of the earnings test are found, probably due to the relation between the effect of the earnings test on own benefits and changes in spousal benefits, relevant to a large fraction of women in the sample. The issue of spouse benefits is not dealt with in the current paper and is an issue of further research.
Neither for men, nor for women, significant effects on the expected claiming age are found. This is puzzling, since theoretical arguments would predict that effects on labor supply and retirement would be accompanied by changes in the expected claiming age. It casts some doubt on whether people choose their (expected) claiming age based on the economic trade-off between leisure and income. This is also an issue for further research.
The conclusion that people adjust their future work and retirement plans to the rules of the social security system is important for public policy. It also implies that people realize that the rules change, giving them at least a chance to reconsider their retirement savings and investment portfolio. On the other hand, the result that the adjustment of plans is largely based on misperception of the rules, ignoring the actuarial adjusted compensation in later years for benefits lost under the earnings test, is also relevant. It confirms that many people do not always base their expectations and decisions on fully rational economic optimization and suggests that providing information and keeping the rules simple and transparent is as important in formulating policy measures as incorporating the desired financial incentives. 
